Introduction
[Part 1] I'm writing a book on "Neutrality in International Relations", published 'Substack-first,' as I write its different parts (aka work in progress). Here is part 1 of the introduction.
With Us or Against Us
Neutrality is one of the most misunderstood—and sometimes intentionally misrepresented—concepts of international relations. It is often connected pejoratively to other notions like pacifism, isolationism, passivity, and aloofness. In the worst case, it is even portrayed as an immoral endeavor that helps evil.
Take Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, who in 2023, when asked about the decision of African states to take a neutral position in the raging Russo-Ukrainian War answered “(…) you cannot be neutral when there is an attack on the very values that we all hold dear that are founded in the UN Charter that we all signed on to. Russia has broken all of those rules, and until they stop this fighting and until they engage in finding a solution, we won’t have one.”[1] She was far from the only one to frame the Russo-Ukrainian War in moral and existential terms. Many Western politicians and commentators promulgated the view that at the heart of the matter was a conflict between right and wrong and, consequently, that those who were not on the side of the victim (Ukraine) by sending it weapons and sanctioning Russia economically were automatically helping the perpetrator (Russia), or, as Slavoj Zizek, argued in a much-circulated essay about The Dark Side of Neutrality, “these countries’ non-alignment amounts to tacit support for imperialism.”[2]
This line of argument; ‘if you are not with the righteous side of a conflict you are automatically with the evil side’ is so paradigmatic that it is hard to find major wars in which it was not invoked in one form or the other. It infamously appeared in the speech of US President George W. Bush, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, when in Congress he enunciated the pillars of what would become the War on Terror, which he framed as “not, however, just America’s fight. And what is at stake is not just America’s freedom. This is the world’s fight. This is civilization’s fight.” Hence, he concluded, “[e]ither you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. (…) Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at war, and we know that God is not neutral between them.”[3]
Similar proclamations about the immorality or unacceptability of neutrality were also abundant during the Cold War, during which both sides—Washington and Moscow—accused neutral and nonaligned states of being tacit supporters of the other side. In 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles declared that neutrality was a notion “which pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others, (…). This has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and short-sighted conception.”[4] Ironically, some Soviet leaders were absolutely in agreement with Dulles. One of Stalin’s aids, Andrei Zhdanov, once remarked that with the world splintering into two camps, hostile to each other, where the USSR represented the force of peace while the US was a force of imperialism, neutrality was out of the question and if states still did try to follow such a path, it was obviously out of malign intent.[5]
We could go on and on, back into the Second World War or its precursor.[6] This argument that neutrality is supportive of evil is one of the most prevalent reactions by belligerents to the desire of third parties to remain outside their violent clashes. And its power goes even further, as it is also deployed inside states to make the case for interventions in foreign wars. It was one of the justifications for NATO’s 1999 attack on Yugoslavia—perpetrated without a Security Council mandate—for the goal of intervening in the ongoing civil war in Kosovo. British Prime Minister Tony Blair at the time declared in an infamous speech in Chicago that “those nations which have the power, have the responsibility,”[7] declaring that standing on the sidelines of the conflict would be immoral for states that are militarily powerful enough to intervene. This notion later transformed into the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) doctrine,[8] a topic that we shall explore in the following chapters.
In short, the moral version of the ‘with us or against us’ argument (there are non-moral versions, too, as we shall see shortly) is an age-old trope whose intellectual roots actually hark back to Just War Theory (JWT),[9]and its precursors in the Judeo-Christian belief systems. JWT-thinking is based on the idea that when there is a “Just War”—most importantly when there is a just reason to fight—it is simply immoral not to support that side. Such a framing of warfare massively shrinks the conceptual space for the justification of neutrality. Only in a situation in which both sides fight an “unjust” war, third parties can, more or less legitimately, distance themselves from both parties. But, considering that one of the just reasons to go to war under classic and modern JWT is self-defense from an unwarranted attack (currently recognized as the only just reason for war in Article 51 of the UN charter) and that for practical purposes usually both sides of a conflict claim justice to be on their side, such moments rarely arise, at least not from the viewpoint of the belligerents. Only a few classical thinkers allocate any space at all in their interpretations of JWT to neutrality,[10] and in general, when wars or international contests between rivaling parties are framed as good vs. evil, arguments for neutrality will meet with a nearly unsurmountable wall of moralism and the accusations that they are co-responsible for evil wreaking havoc.
Friends to All and Foe to None
However, the sentiment that war creates a binary situation and non-committed third parties must choose their alliance is not confined to moral arguments alone. It is a deeply engrained perception, especially in Western societies, that third parties at some point need to ‘choose their camp.’ In one memorable exchange in 2022, India’s Foreign Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, in a public debate had to forcefully push back against the assertions of his interviewer and the audience that India, at some point, would need to choose sides.
Jaishankar: There is a linkage today which is being made, (...) a linkage between China and India and what’s happening in Ukraine. So come on guys, I mean, China and India happened way before anything happened in Ukraine. So, the Chinese don’t need a president somewhere else in the world on how to (…) engage us or not engage us or be difficult with us or not be difficult with us. So, (...) I just see this as frankly a not-very clever argument, a very self-serving one. And this idea that (...) your grand strategy must be about how you will choose—I will do as all of us do. I will weigh the situation (...).
Interviewer interrupts: Minister Jaishankar, there will always be two axes. At this point I think it’s an understood, accepted fact that you have the West, US-led, you have China as the next potential axis, where does India fit into this (...).
Jaishankar: No. I’m sorry. That is exactly where I disagree with you. This is the construct you are trying to impose on me, and I don’t accept it. (...) I don’t think it’s necessary for me to join this axis or not, and if I’m not joining this I must be with the other one. I don’t accept that. (...) I am one-fifth of the world’s population, I am today the fifth or sixth largest economy in the world, I mean forget the history civilization bit, everybody knows that, but I think I’m entitled to have my own side, I’m entitled to weigh my own interest, make my own choices, and my choices will not be cynical and transactional, but they will be a balance of my values and my interest. There is no country in the world which disregards its interests.[11]
(Min 21:10-23:08)
Contrast the above exchange with Thucydides’ ‘Melian Dialogue,’ the most classic work of the modern realist school of International Relations one can imagine. In this last part of book five of his monumental ‘History of the Peloponnesian War,’ Thucydides recounts the tragic occurrences around the island state of Melos. In the warfare between Sparta and Athens, Melos, despite having been a colony of Sparta, had chosen to remain neutral. Initially (in 426 BC), the Athenians had tried to change this attitude through a military campaign against the island’s coastal areas but when this proved ineffective in scaring the island into submission, the Athenians withdrew, grudgingly accepting Melos’ neutral status for 10 years. However, in 416 BC, the Athenians decided to force a decision, visiting Melos once again with an Armada of their naval power, to convince them to join the war alliance on their side—or perish if they continued to resist.[12] The Athenians actually landed on the shores of the island and had a diplomatic exchange with the Melian leadership, arguing their case:
Melians: (…) would [you] not consent to our being neutral, friends instead of enemies, but allies of neither side.
Athenians: No; for your hostility cannot so much hurt us as your friendship will be an argument to our subjects of our weakness, and your enmity of our power.
(…)
Athenians: (…) besides extending our empire we should gain in security by your subjection; the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea.
Melians: (…) How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who shall look at our case and conclude from it that one day or another you will attack them? And what is this but to make greater the enemies that you have already, and to force others to become so who would otherwise have never thought of it?
Athenians: Why, the fact is that continentals generally give us but little alarm; the liberty which they enjoy will long prevent their taking precautions against us; it is rather islanders like yourselves, outside our empire, and subjects smarting under the yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger. (...).[13]
After some more deliberations, the Athenians gave the Malians time to deliberate, after which the islanders told their militarily far superior opponents the following:
Melians: Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. (…) we invite you to allow us to be friends to you and foes to neither party, and to retire from our country after making such a treaty as shall seem fit to us both.[14]
At this point, the Athenians withdrew from the conference, commenced besieging the city, and ultimately destroyed won militarily, killing all the men of fighting age and enslaving the rest, while bringing their own settlers to colonize the land. To this day, the Melian Dialogue is a cautionary tale for realists in international relations of what can happen when a state puts its faith in abstract concepts like justice among nations or divine rights, rather than concrete military force. However, Melos back then, just as India is today, also exemplifies another core issue of international relations; the urge and will of some actors not to ally themselves but, in a more generalized version from how Thucydides put it, remain friends to all and foe to none.
The two exchanges, even though 2500 years apart, are paradigmatic for the problem at the heart of what this book discusses. The position of neutral actors is not between but among quarreling parties in international relations. In the analytical sense, neutral actors are countries, organizations, and sometimes even individuals, that have agency in the international system and maintain—either out of self-interest or for necessity—an independent position from others, distancing themselves not from the parties of a conflict but from the conflict itself. They are the third corner of a triangle and the problem they face is that to maintain this position, they need to convince both of their quarreling partners to let that happen.
It’s a difficult position and the core of any neutral’s greatest problem during and even after conflicts. They usually still suffer repercussions during the conflicts of their partners while the fighting is going on in the form of trade restrictions or other reprisals from belligerents for their insubordination. And after the contest is over, whichever side wins, the neutrals will not be part of that camp. Neutrals are never on ‘the right side of history’—that is, on the side that wins. They might be subject, again, to criticism and demands for reparation, or they might become the target of active attacks as a secondary target, as we have just seen with the Melians. Of course, much of this will depend on the power status of the neutral in question. Many great power neutrals like Russia in the late 18th century, the USA during most of the 19th century, or Great Britain in its second half would suffer far fewer repercussions than small power neutrals like Switzerland, Belgium, or Sweden during and after the two World Wars. For the Swiss, the disdain of the victors of the Second World War went so far that the United Nations when its new design took shape in 1944 and 1945, many—especially the French—argued that neutrality was incompatible with the new organization and that any country that wanted to join its ranks had to renounce neutrality as a political principle.
The Core of the Issue
To cut a long story short, this book is all about Thucydides’ definition of neutrality, its systematization, an analysis of cases, and a discussion of what this implies for neutral actors in general. Its central argument is that the core of what neutrality in international relations is about is the basic constellation depicted in Figure 1. When it comes to neutrality, this schematic is the single most important thing to understand. Everything about the topic, in one way or another, relates to this basic constellation; a minimum of three actors connected by three relationships, a conflict context that engulfs them, and the directionality of the neutrality vector. Everything about neutrality, from its politics, law, history, diplomacy, military strategy, and even norms is tethered to this constellation. It is the system-inherent ‘logic of neutrality’ and forms the subject of chapter 4, which will explore its many variations and complications.
Figure 1: Logic of Neutrality.
Note: Two belligerents (B1, B2) are in conflict (flash), while at peace (peace sign) with neutral actor (A), whose neutrality is directed toward the conflict. All actors are part of a conflict constellation. ©Pascal Lottaz
A central aspect of the argument in this book is that while neutrality is often portrayed as referring to actors ‘caught between’ quarreling parties, that is a most misleading mental image because it camouflages the driver of what is absolutely fundamental to any neutral, namely the conflict of its partners. It is much more fruitful to understand neutrals as a third pole in a triangular relationship. In fact, although it is not explicit in the original text as the ancient Greeks actually did not have a single word for the concept of not taking sides in conflicts,[15] the Thucydidean definition of this position—being friends to all and foe to neither—is captured in the very word ‘neutrality,’ which is a derivative of the Latin compound ‘ne’ (not) and ‘uter’ (either),[16] from which follows that if it is not either of two then it must be a third thing. The etymological root of ‘neutrality’ does not relate to a middle position.
It must be emphasized, however, that this is not the case for all possible translations of the word. In some non-Indo-European languages, the translation of the term in fact does emphasize the very ‘in-betweenness’ that this book contests. For instance, the Chinese ‘Zhongli’ and Japanese ‘Chuuritsu’ (both written as 中立) literally mean ‘standing in the middle.’ It is worth noting though that the Japanese, in the second half of the 19thcentury, developed a rather intriguing addition to their translation for the Western legal term of neutrality in international law by adding the prefix kyokugai (局外), ‘Outside the Situation,’ to more appropriately capture the meaning of the concept—kyokugai chuuritsu (局外中立), or ‘standing in the middle, [but] outside the situation.’[17] This word is not in use anymore today, but it is one of the more appropriate ways to capture the logic of neutrality in the international sphere, as it will be discussed throughout this book. Chapter 3 looks in detail at different traditions to express or deal with neutrality as a naturally occurring phenomenon and idea across cultures and languages.
The neutral predicament stems from being outside the primary conflict of two belligerents while being caught inside a broader conflict constellation together with them. A neutral actor, by definition, is at peace with those who are at war with each other. But while the neutral remains uninvolved in the conflict itself, it can never dissociate itself from the broader political ramifications the conflict creates—that is the conflict constellation.[18] This is the main problem; neutrals are friends with enemies, and the mutual enemies, while often appreciative of their friendship with the neutral, are usually highly adversarial to the neutral’s friendship with their opponent(s). The art of neutrality then is the skill to maintain both friendships, even at the height of warfare, without giving one or the other side a reason to change the relationship into open conflict.[19] And, as many neutrals throughout history had to learn, ‘friendship’ in international relations is not necessarily of the friendly type. A neutral’s friends can become quite nasty when it comes to inducing them to sever ties with their enemies—the Melians had to learn that the hard way. However, let us not get ahead of ourselves and discuss the basics first, because from the logic of neutrality, at least four important implications follow:
· Neutrality is anywhere and everywhere a reaction to conflict.
· The nature of a conflict determines the form of a functional neutrality.
· Neutrals are not situated between but among conflicting parties.
· Neutrals are neutral toward the conflict, not toward belligerents.
These aspects are treated in detail in Chapter 4, but their implication is that the neutrality of third-party actors always needs to be understood in relation to the conflict(s) that they are directed toward. Even permanent neutrality of the modern type as Switzerland, Austria, Malta, Ireland, or Turkmenistan are practicing (in their various national forms), that exist during peace-time are geared toward and motivated by conflict—albeit toward hypothetical conflicts in the future, not necessarily toward a concretely existing one. Permanent neutrality is the promise of remaining neutral even toward conflicts that have not yet broken out and that creates for all these countries some policy implications which they then autonomously implement domestically.
The question, ‘what is neutrality’ does not have a single answer. It means different things in different circumstances (and to different people). The model above is thus a massive simplification and cannot render justice to the depth of the topic. Reality is much messier and more complex than that. However, every model must simplify its subjects of investigation to render universalizable insights. To remedy this shortcoming, Chapter 2 gives an overview of the various manifestations of neutrality that we find over time and geographies to comparatively present the richness of the field. But the principal contestation of this book remains the same. Wherever we find instances of neutrality—be that in its legal form, or as a term of art to describe neutralism or nonalignment, be it the policies of humanitarian NGOs, or as principles of international organizations, down to the policies of nation-states—they relate, in one form or another, to this basic logic and are influenced by it. Hence it makes sense to study this constellation and understand its implications.
To be continued…
Previous Sections
[1] United States Mission to the United Nations, "Remarks by Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield in Conversation with Jonquilyn Hill of ‘The Weeds’ Podcast at TruCon 2023.," news release, 2023, https://usun.usmission.gov/remarks-by-ambassador-linda-thomas-greenfield-in-conversation-with-jonquilyn-hill-of-the-weeds-podcast-at-trucon-2023.
[2] Slavoj Zizek, "The Dark Side of Neutrality," Project Syndicate, February 17, 2023, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/neutrality-functions-as-support-for-russian-aggression-by-slavoj-zizek-2023-02.
[3] George W. Bush, "Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People," September 20, 2001.
[4] "Dulles Declares Neutrality Pose Is Obsolete Idea," New York Times, June 10 1956.
[5] Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko, and Peter Ruggenthaler, eds., The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe(Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 550.
[6] Abbenhuis, An Age of Neutrals: Great Power Politics, 1815-1914, 10–12.
[7] Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community," British Political Speech, April 22, 1999, http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279.
[8] Alex J. Bellamy, "Sovereignty Redefined: The Promise and Practice of R2P," in The Responsibility to Protect Twenty Years On: rhetoric and Implementation, ed. Pinar Gözen Ercan (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).
[9] Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals: A General History, 7–23.
[10] Hugo Grotius at least accepted qualified versions of neutrality as legitimate when neutrals did not join wars but provided aid to the just side of a war. See Hedley Bull, "The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations," in Hugo Grotius and International Relations, ed. Benedict Kingsbury and Adam Roberts (Oxfrod: Oxford University Press, 1992), 88.
[11] The Print, "'India is not sitting on the fence', says External Affairs Minister S.Jaishankar," (YouTube) June 3, 2022…
[12] Micahel G. Seaman, "The Athenian Expedition to Melos in 416 B.C.," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte 46, no. 4 (1997).
[13] Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 398–99.
[14] Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, 403.
[15] Robert A. Bauslaugh, The Concept of Neutrality in Classical Greece (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), XX.
[16] The compound of ‘ne’ and ‘uter’ is by the way also linked to the English word ‘neither,’ which expresses the same idea of being not one nor the other in a more than bi-polar constellation.
[17] For an account of the norm transition of neutrality to Japan (which had living relatively secluded for 250 years until the 1850s), see Douglas Howland, "Japanese Neutrality in the Nineteenth Century: International Law and Transcultural Process," Journal of Transcultural Studies 1, no. 1 (2010), https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.11588/ts.2010.1.1927.
[18] In the linguistic differentiation developed in chapter 4, we differentiate between “uninvolved” third-parties to conflicts—the neutrals—and “non-involved” non-parties that are truly outside the conflict constellation but thereby also don’t count as neutral toward a conflict, as they lack all and any cognizance about its existence.
[19] There are various case-specific studies of this art. See for instance Maartje M. Abbenhuis, The Art of Staying Neutral: The Netherlands in the First World War, 1914-1918 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006); Neville Wylie, ed., European Neutrals and Non-belligerents during the Second World War, vol. 6 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Helena F. S. Lopes, Neutrality and Collaboration in South China: Macau during the Second World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023).