Switzerland’s Shifting Security Discourse

The Swiss Are Flirting With NATO, But Breaking Up With Neutrality Is Not (Yet) An Option.

Two Security Models on the Table

Switzerland’s security discourse is going through one of its most serious revisions of the past 200 years. The new multipolar security environment and a brewing change of hearts domestically are eroding traditional reference frames. This is expressed most visibly in a new debate about the country’s neutrality—the traditional North Star of Swiss security thinking. While Switzerland joined all EU sanctions against Russia and embedded itself rhetorically deeply in the Western camp, it has refrained so far from sending weapons to Ukraine or breaching the basic rules of neutrality in armed conflict when it comes to the actual warfare taking place in Eastern Europe. But there are forces inside the country that would like to change this. They are using the current climate of insecurity about Europe’s military future to argue their case that only integration with NATO can protect the Swiss.

While neutrality is not the only security factor, it is a fundamental one in terms of strategy and long-term planning. The basic issue is this: Will Switzerland continue to seek security through armed neutrality or is it going to follow the Swedish and Finnish models, seeking security through collective defense within NATO and EU structures? Despite announcements by the head of Switzerland’s Defense Department, Federal Councilor Viola Amherd,^[1] that Switzerland is not contemplating NATO membership, top officials are not only thinking about the option but are actively preparing the ground for it. However, due to Switzerland’s direct democratic system, the question of which course Switzerland will follow cannot be settled by a few politicians or their parties alone. Only the country’s entire political process can do so—and this will be in full swing for a few more years yet. In the meantime, Switzerland’s concrete military security strategy hangs awkwardly in the air as it is itself subject to different political visions.

Incompatible Strategies

Security through armed neutrality

The basic problem is that security through collective defense and security through armed neutrality rest on two different and (in principle) incompatible strategies. Security through armed neutrality is based on a mix of “small stick” and “small carrot” approaches. On the one hand, armed neutrals use their limited military abilities to threaten potential invaders with a certain level of pain, signaling that an attacker would have to pay a considerable price in blood and treasure to overcome the neutral’s defenses (the small stick). On the other hand, neutrals offer extensive collaboration, meaning that even potentially hostile parties can obtain benefits through trade and cooperation to a limited degree (the small carrot). However, stationing troops or using the neutral’s infrastructure for military purposes remain strictly off-limits. Militarily neutral states maintain their own deterrents while simultaneously presenting their usefulness to all powers in the international arena, incentivizing them to seek the neutral’s benefits by peaceful means and not through force of arms.

This was the strategy of most armed neutrals during the Second World War, of which some were successful (Portugal, Spain, Ireland Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey) while others failed to deter the Axis (Belgium, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, etc.), or the Allies (Iceland, Iran), or both.^[2] The great weakness of a neutral security approach is that if the small carrot is not big enough and the small stick looks too weak, an adversary will choose to pay the price in blood to get everything it wants by military means. In the worst case, a neutral can become itself the primary object of bellicose desire, as was the case of the neutral Melians who were purged by ancient Athens in the Peloponnesian Wars,^[3] or for the neutral Kingdom of Hawaii, which the United States overthrew and annexed in the 1890s.^[4]

For the neutral security approach to work, armed neutrals need a viable incentive structure toward other powers, and they must keep an independent deterrence potential, albeit one below the threshold of posing an offensive security threat. They must avoid the security dilemma in which their military readiness could be seen as a potentially offensive threat by adversaries and trigger the logic of preemptive military strikes to disarm them. The latter was one of the main reasons why Sweden gave up its nuclear program in the Cold War. Stockholm understood that acquiring nuclear weapons might actually increase the chances of a Soviet preemptive attack rather than protect its independence.^[5]

Security through collective defense

Security through collective defense, in contrast, rests on the “big stick” logic, realized through strength in numbers. The three-musketeer principle “one for all, all for one” means that inside an alliance, states seek to increase deterrence to a maximum to scare off potential invaders through their combined might. This also implies the sharing of military abilities, including weapons systems that go all the way to nuclear arms. An essential part of modern alliances is the “nuclear umbrella” which the United States explicitly extends to South Korea, Japan, and its European NATO partners. The collective defense approach, especially through large and operationally integrated alliances like NATO, aims at projecting so much power that no adversary would even think of picking a fight with it.

The benefits of alliances are straightforward, as they increase a state's deterrence capacity many-fold. However, they also imply the risk of “entrapment,” meaning that a state might be forced to go to war against its will to help another alliance member—even if that ally might have acted unwisely. Alliances can also be used by powerful members to police the behavior of smaller members. The Warsaw Pact, for instance, twice invaded its own members (Hungary and Czechoslovakia) to restore the national political forces that the Soviet Union favored. In the worst-case scenario, opposing but interlocking alliances might even lead to massive wars out of relatively small trigger events that kick off chain reactions, drawing one state after another into the fight. The First World War is the standard example of how large numbers of states can “sleepwalk” into a war of alliances.^[6]

In principle, the two strategies are mutually incompatible not only because their basic tenets cancel each other out (although there is no international law on this issue, it is largely accepted that a military-neutral state cannot be part of a military alliance), but also because they create dangerous strategic vulnerabilities if mixed. If a state without security guarantees from other countries starts cooperating with an alliance, it makes itself the first target of attack by a potential adversary of that alliance, as it is the weakest and least protected link in the structure. Adversaries are further incentivized to strike non-allied nations if their cooperation with a hostile alliance becomes important to that alliance. If, for instance, a strike against the neutral can hurt the entire alliance because military systems are integrated and a blow against the neutral’s infrastructure will weaken the military capabilities of the alliance, then a preemptive strike against the cooperating neutral becomes a tempting option. In fact, international law forbids neutrals from offering their infrastructure (including radio wave transmission) to belligerent powers,^[7] as this is an un-neutral act helping one side of a conflict and making it more likely that an adversary will strike the neutral to weaken the primary enemy. More could (and should) be said about the notion of “benevolent neutrality,” its risks, and legal implications,^[8] but for the sake of brevity, we will continue with the analysis of where Switzerland stands regarding these two security options.

NATO, Neutrality, or Both?

Superficially, it seems clear that Switzerland still bets on security through neutrality. Annual opinion polls show that an overwhelming majority of 91% are in favor of maintaining neutrality (as of 2024).^[9]

Tibor Szvircsev Tresch et al., Studie «Sicherheit 2024» (Zürich: Militärakademie (MILAK) an der ETHZ, 2024), 55.

However, the same polls also indicate that there are significant differences in the views of what that neutrality should include—and what not. Especially on the question of military cooperation with NATO, 52% agree that Switzerland should cooperate more closely with the alliance.^[10] 30% of respondents even agree with the statement “Switzerland should join NATO,” which means that at least 21% of respondents do not see NATO and Neutrality as incompatible.^[11] Furthermore, there are also important differences within the population. Generally, younger people are less likely to view NATO (or cooperation with it) favorably, while respondents with higher educational backgrounds are more likely to support cooperation and even accession.

But more political forces pull and push the debate in various directions. For instance, a recent study by Ejdus and Hoeffler^[12] shows that elites in neutral and nonaligned countries tend to view NATO and Trans-Atlantic integration in general much more favorably than opinion polls would suggest. The authors find that “[a]tlanticist preferences are not only widely shared among policy elites but also systematically concealed from the public across militarily-neutral European countries”  and that “elites frequently avoid public expressions of these preferences due to the general population’s deep-rooted attachment to their nation’s policy of military neutrality or non-alignment.”^[13] While this study focuses only on Sweden, Austria, and Serbia, it is not far-fetched to infer that also in Switzerland policymakers in the federal administration might view NATO in a more favorable light than the general public. After all, the Federal Council has made no secret of its preferences. Over the past three years, it has published four white papers or studies in which it embraced the idea of more security cooperation with NATO and the EU to a level never seen in Swiss history. The 2022 report says that:

Switzerland has long sought to have options in the event of an armed attack, either to defend itself independently or to organize its defense together with other states. To improve military cooperation capabilities and thereby increase Switzerland's freedom of action, the army must prepare for international cooperation in a timely manner. The possibilities for cooperation should be utilized to enhance defense capabilities while adhering to neutrality.^[14]

The 2024 report even recommends the interoperability of Swiss military systems with NATO standards through “gradual participation” in NATO certification processes. It is suggested that if “necessary, NATO could assess and certify the interoperability and military capabilities of designated units of the Swiss Army,” meaning that Switzerland would not only ‘aspire’ to be NATO compatible but already make sure NATO itself certifies its interoperability. Furthermore, the report goes on to suggest Switzerland should participate in NATO’s “Federated Mission Networking” (FMN) project, the aim of which is “to integrate the command and communication systems of the armed forces into a single multinational command system, to establish an integral command capability on a technical level.” And because “FMN is considered a cornerstone of any cooperation with NATO (…), Swiss participation is necessary.”^[15] There is no doubt that the vision of this Federal Council report is the transformation of Switzerland’s armed forces into an operable part of NATO’s overall military capacity. The passage concludes that

[t]his collaboration would enable Switzerland, if necessary, to integrate its own systems into NATO's command and communication systems from the beginning of a joint exercise or operation—whether in military peace-building or defense. NATO refers to this as "Day Zero Connectivity," a capability Switzerland must have if needed.^[16]

While critics argue that this approach amounts to the operational abandonment of neutrality,^[17] the Federal Council holds it is merely preparing for the worst-case scenario of an armed attack against Switzerland. Should that happen, the legal requirements of neutrality law would cease anyway, and the country could defend itself collectively. In other words, the Federal Council’s preferred course of action is to prepare the ground for collective self-defense—but only should the need for it arise.

The fourth and most recent report by a Defense Department-appointed study commission also concluded that cooperation with NATO and the EU “must go beyond the previous collaboration due to the new threat situation. Cooperation should be focused on joint defense [emphasis added].”^[18] Furthermore, there have been concrete efforts over the past two years to follow up on these policy guidelines, including high-level meetings of Swiss and NATO military representatives,^[19] an agreement on opening a NATO liaison office in Geneva (albeit officially not to liaise with the Federal Government),^[20] a memorandum of understanding about Switzerland joining the EU Sky-shield initiative,^[21] and, most visibly, Frau Amherd’s participation at a North Atlantic Council Meeting (the political arm of NATO)—a first in Switzerland’s history.^[22]

Not a Done Deal, Nor Party Politics

However, while the political and military rapprochement between Switzerland and NATO is obvious and evident, there are, at the same time, other forces inside the country’s political process, resisting or nuancing this course. Not only did the Federal Council itself publish a report on its neutrality policy in October 2022, concluding that the principles outlined back in 1993 are still valid and the basis for its decision-making,^[23] but the National Council (the lower and more powerful chamber of parliament) voted for a motion that would forbid Switzerland’s participation in NATO missions that practice collective self-defense under Article 5 of the NATO charter. The motion presented in the name of the Security Policy Committee holds that:

From the Commission's perspective, it is in Switzerland's interest to strengthen cooperation with NATO in specific areas, particularly in military peace promotion, cyberattack defense, or system interoperability, to be prepared for potential future cooperation in case of an emergency. At the same time, the Commission recognizes the need for clarification regarding the preservation of Switzerland's neutrality and non-alignment. Switzerland's neutrality and non-alignment remain important and useful instruments of Swiss security and foreign policy, even in these times.^[24]

The success of the motion in the National Council was possible due to a political realignment of NATO-skeptical factions among left- and right-wing parties.^[25] This trend is also visible on other levels of society, most evidently in the form of a popular initiative for a national neutrality referendum. If successful, the initiative would define neutrality in Switzerland’s constitution (where the concept is currently only mentioned but not specified) as perpetual, armed, alliance-free, and—for the first time in any constitutional neutrality—it would include the state’s duty to remain economically neutral by avoiding the imposition of sanctions on belligerent parties.^[26] As of summer 2024, the initiative has gained the necessary signatures to become a referendum (in 2025 or 2026) and kicked off a lively public debate crossing traditional party lines. While the idea initially gained popularity due to the support of former Federal Councilor and right-wing fire-brand Christopher Blocher, the citizen committee that worked out the concrete initiative text is not beholden to any party, and it includes left and right-wing activists alike. Furthermore, during the 18 months allocated for signature gathering, a separate committee of academics, unionists, and politicians from left and green parties formed that supported the initiative, including many figureheads of the communist party.^[27] Five months later, another group of academics and politicians published a counter-proposal against the initiative, advocating for a much more discretionary approach to Swiss neutrality.^[28] Evidently, support for the neutrality initiative is not a question of party politics but one of security thinking and perceptions.

Conclusion: No Silver Bullets. Only Pragmatism.

In its national security discourse, Switzerland is currently between a rock and a hard place. The country has not made up its mind on whether to pursue national security under a pure collective defense strategy or a proper strategy of neutrality. This creates dangerous strategic vulnerabilities, which military planners should take into consideration in their short- and medium-term planning. While a direct kinetic attack on Switzerland is at this point unlikely due to its geographic location surrounded by friendly nations, the dilemmas and vulnerabilities that result from this strategic “in-between” situation should be taken into account when planning conflict scenarios and in political discussions with security partners.

Both security strategies have their weaknesses and can fail to produce security. There are no silver bullets in international relations. Switzerland has been successfully using the former approach for the last 200 years, although the meaning of its neutrality and what the country used as small sticks and small carrots changed over time and are changing again now. Integrated international supply chains for arms production, military procurements abroad, and the country’s geo-economic position are only some of the factors that constrain its policy choices. The question for military strategists is not if Switzerland should cooperate with foreign powers, but how far that cooperation can go and at what point more cooperation might actually decrease its security. At some point, the country’s military neutrality might become NATO’s next collateral damage.

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^[1] "«Ein Nato-Beitritt ist ausgeschlossen»," Blick, May 19 2022, https://www.vbs.admin.ch/it/ein-nato-beitritt-ist-ausgeschlossen-i.

^[2] Norway was already slated for invasion by Great Britain when Hitler invaded first.

^[3] Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. Richard Crawley, 1874 ed. (London: Longmans, 431 BC), 396–404.

^[4] David Keanu Sai, "Hawaiian Neutrality: From the Crimean Conflict through the Spanish-American War," Paper presented at the University of Cambridge, UK, Centre for Research in the Arts, Social Sciences and Humanities, Sovereignty and Imperialism: Non-European Powers in the Age of Empire, September 10–12  (2015).

^[5] Thomas Jonter, The Key to Nuclear Restraint: The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

^[6] Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914,  (London: Penguin Books, 2012).

^[7] See Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention.

^[8] See, for reference, Luca Ferro and Nele Verlinden, "Neutrality During Armed Conflicts: A Coherent Approach to Third-State Support for Warring Parties," Chinese Journal of International Law, no. 17 (2018); Stephen C. Neff, "A Tale of Two Strategies: Permanent Neutrality and Collective Security," in Permanent Neutrality: A Model for Peace, Security, and Justice, ed. Herbert Reginbogin and Pascal Lottaz (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020).

^[9] Tibor Szvircsev Tresch et al., Studie «Sicherheit 2024» (Zürich: Militärakademie (MILAK) an der ETHZ, 2024), 55.

^[10] Szvircsev Tresch et al., Studie «Sicherheit 2024», 46.

^[11] Szvircsev Tresch et al., Studie «Sicherheit 2024», 42.

^[12] Filip Ejdus and Catherine Hoeffler, "Crypto-Atlanticism: The untold preferences of policy elites in neutral and non-aligned states," Contemporary Security Policy  (2023), https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2289329.

^[13] Ejdus and Hoeffler, "Crypto-Atlanticism," 26.

^[14] Bundesrat, Zusatzbericht zum Sicherheitspolitischen Bericht 2021 über die Folgen des Krieges in der Ukraine (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, September 7, 2022), 38–39.

^[15] Bundesrat, Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Kooperation (Bern: Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, Januar 31, 2024), 27. https://www.newsd.admin.ch/newsd/message/attachments/85931.pdf.

^[16] Bundesrat, Verteidigungsfähigkeit und Kooperation, 27.

^[17] “Globalist Elites Are Trying To Fool Even Switzerland Into the Alliance | Alberto Togni” (YouTube, April 27, 2024).

^[18] Katja Gentinetta, Bericht der Studienkommission Sicherheitspolitik (Bern: Eidgenössisches Departement für Verteidigung, Bevölkerungsschutz und Sport, 2024), 39.

^[19] "Der Chef der Armee nimmt am Treffen der Nato-Armeechefs in Brüssel teil," Medienmitteilung der Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, January 18 2024, https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-99740.html.

^[20] "Direktor der Direktion für Völkerrecht unterzeichnet Abkommen über rechtlichen Status des NATO-Verbindungsbüros in Genf," Medienmitteilung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, July 15 2024, https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-101857.html.

^[21] Federal Council, "Federal Council decides to join the European Sky Shield Initiative," Portal of the Swiss Government  (2024), https://www.admin.ch/gov/en/start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-100650.html.

^[22] "In a historic first, Swiss defence minister joins meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Council," North Atlantic Treaty Organization, March 22 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_213105.htm?selectedLocale=en.

^[23] Schweizerischer Bundesrat, "Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 22.3385, Aussenpolitische Kommission SR, 11.04.2022," (Berne, October 26 2022). https://www.admin.ch/gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-90895.html.

^[24] Sicherheitspolitische Kommission, "Fokussierung auf die verfassungsmässigen Aufgaben der Armee. Keine Teilnahme an Nato-Bündnisfallübungen!," Nationalrat, June 13 2024, https://www.parlament.ch/en/ratsbetrieb/amtliches-bulletin/amtliches-bulletin-die-verhandlungen?SubjectId=65056.

^[25] Andrea Fopp, "Wie linke Pazifisten und rechte Neutralitäts-Turbos die Schweiz abschotten wollen," Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 24 2024, https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/landesverraeterin-pazifisten-erleben-harte-zeiten-und-suchen-ausgerechnet-die-naehe-zur-svp-ld.1834557.

^[26] Verein zur Wahrung der Schweizer Neutralität. “Die Neutralitätsinitiative”, neutralitaet.ja.ch, accessed on August 26, 2024.

^[27] Pascal Lottaz, Verena Tobler Linder, and Wolf Linder, "Call from Left and Green Supporters: Yes to the Neutrality Initiative!," neutralitystudies.com, January 10 2024.

^[28] Cottier et all., «Manifest Neutralität 21», Association La Suisse en Europe. May 29, 2024. https://suisse-en-europe.ch/neutralitaet-21.

Photo by Silvan Rüegg and Joshua Earle on Unsplash